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If	  ecocriticism	  has	  been	  a	  form	  of	  scholarship	  that	   is	   integrated	  with	  an	  activist	  practice,	   that	  
activism	  has	  most	  often	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  rhetorical	  appeals	  to	  conservation	  and	  to	  valuation	  
of	  a	  specific	  place	  (or	  “place”	  as	  such),	  a	  species,	  or	  even	  a	  privileged	  mode	  of	  representation	  
such	   as	   the	   pastoral,	   the	   work	   of	   the	   bioregionally-­‐grounded	   poet,	   or	   green	   themes	   in	  
middlebrow	   novels	   (Garrard,	   2005).	   	   Ecocriticism-­‐as-­‐advocacy	   assumes	   a	   particular	   view	   of	  
time.	   	   An	   active	   present	   is	   taken	  as	   a	  means	   of	   forestalling	   an	   undesirable	   future,	  with	   little	  
account	  for	  the	  past;	  the	  critic	  is	  in	  a	  race	  against	  time	  to	  explicate	  the	  water	  images	  in	  this	  or	  
that	   poem,	   and	   heated	   debate	   concerns	   the	   limits	   of	   an	   appropriate	   canon	   for	   such	   an	  
enterprise1.	  	  Meanwhile,	  historically-­‐informed	  and	  materialist	  approaches	  to	  ecocriticism,	  have	  
been	  proposed,	  which	   look	   to	   the	  past	  as	  a	   field	  of	  determinations	  and	   limits	  on	   the	  present:	  	  
the	  present	  as	  the	  given	  product,	  finished	  or	  not,	  of	  past	  causes2.	  	  Both	  these	  approaches,	  and	  
the	  Utopian	  mode—so	  promising	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  imagine	  a	  positive	  political	  program	  in	  addition	  
to	   the	  earnest	  advocacy	  we	  already	  have	  of	   the	  conserve	   this	  and	  care	   for	   that	   type—are	  all	  
predicated	   on	   two	   unspoken	   and	   contradictory	   a	   priori:	   	   time	   as	   a	   matrix	   of	   causality,	   and	  
hence	   the	   objects	   of	   time	   as	   legible	   in	   space	   in	   the	   present,	   on	   one	   side;	   time	   as	   a	  
transhistorical	  and	  transcendent	  Now	  of	  reflection	  and	  contemplation	  or	  another.	  	  The	  former,	  
in	   that	   it	  supports	  a	  view	  of	  nature	  as	  a	  time-­‐produced	  and	  time-­‐bound	  formation	  vulnerable	  
and	  impermanent	  in	  its	  complexity,	  is	  appropriate	  to	  an	  activist	  stance	  as	  something	  to	  defend;	  
the	   latter	   predicates	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   criticism,	   specifically	   a	   detached	   and	   aesthetically-­‐
oriented	  gaze.	   	  Both	  positions	  have	  merit.	   	  However,	  neither	  is	  wholly	  or	  solely	  adequate,	  and	  
there	  remains	  between	  them	  a	  conceptual	  tension	  if	  not	  contradiction	  between	  the	  political	  and	  
critical	  engagements	  characteristic	  of	  ecocriticism	  since	  the	  1980s.	  
	  
Among	  ecocritics,	  there	  has	  been	  no	  systematic	  and	  critical	  treatment	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  time	  relative	  to	  nature	  
and	  culture	  as	  processes	  in	  history,	  which	  is	  to	  say,	  no	  account	  of	  time	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  an	  activist,	  historicist,	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and	   dialectical	   ecocriticism	   yet.	   	   Ecocriticism.	   	   Following	   approaches	   to	   critical	   practice	   taken	   by	   Antonio	  
Gramsci	   and	  especially	   the	   less-­‐well-­‐known	  Karel	   Kosik	   (a	  philosopher	   and	  democratic	   activist	   of	   the	  Prague	  
Spring	  of	  1968),	  I	  propose	  a	  framework	  in	  which	  to	  understand	  the	  activist	  present	  vis	  a	  vis	  the	  historical	  past	  
inclusive	   of	   geologic,	   biologic,	   and	   anthropologic	   scales—the	   present	   emerging	   from	   these	   matrices—and	  
hence	  the	  future	  as	  something	  contestable	  by	  those	  with	  some	  understanding	  of	  nature	  and	  social	  formations	  
as	   processes,	   a	   sort	   of	   knowledge	   Perry	   Anderson	   refers	   to	   as	   “causal	   knowledge”	   (85),	   opposed	   to	   the	  
contemplative	  transhistoricism	  or	  transcendence	  of	  the	  historical	  latent	  in	  much	  ecocritical	  work	  and	  perhaps	  
epitomized	  in	  the	  recent	  meditations	  of	  Murali	  Sivaramakrishnan	  (2011)3.	  	  Beginning	  instead	  with	  a	  dialectic	  of	  
consciousness	  and	  conditions,	   this	  paper	  puts	   forward	  a	  materialist	  understanding	  of	   temporality	   in	  order	   to	  
give	   conceptual	   clarity	   to	   ecocriticism's	   hermeneutical	   and	   political	   projects,	   and	   to	   show	   how	   they	   can	   be	  
integrated.	   	   By	   extension,	   this	   closes	   the	   gap	   between	   activist	   and	   scientific	   eco-­‐	   and	   the	   subjectivist	   or	  
aesthetic	  transcendence	  of	  disciplinary	  -­‐criticism,	  by	  predicating	  the	  critical	  act	  in	  and	  of	  a	  specified	  position	  in	  
ecological	  time,	  as	  a	  constitutive	  function	  of	  that	  moment.	  
	  
The	  approach	   I	   propose	  has	   another	   advantage:	   	   at	   present,	  much	  ecocritical	  work	  often	   lacks	   a	  position	  of	  
critique	   that	   is	   reflexive	   and	   aware	   of	   the	   material	   and	   political	   situation	   in	   which	   it	   is	   produced.	   	   This	   is	  
because	  the	  transcendental	  position	  of	  subjective	  retreat	  debilitates	  a	  rigorous	  understanding	  of	  causality	  and	  
determination,	  as	  though	  the	  critic	  is	  somehow	  above	  or	  beyond	  contingency4.	  	  One	  can	  posit	  a	  transhistorical	  
Present	   in	   which	   epiphanies	   or	   spontaneous	   whatevers	   may	   emerge,	   but	   only	   at	   the	   risk	   of	   sacrificing	   the	  
materialist	   premises	   that	   make	   ecocriticism	   plausibly	   ecological,	   insofar	   as	   ecology	   is	   the	   science	   of	   life	  
systems,	   the	   “given”	   material	   from	   which	   culture	   emerges	   and	   on	   which	   it	   depends,	   to	   use	   Sebastiano	  
Timpanaro's	  terms.	  	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  frame	  a	  theory	  of	  temporality	  that	  specifies	  the	  location	  of	  the	  
ecocritic	  in	  time,	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  activist	  knowledge	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ecological	  and	  social	  history	  of	  the	  
present5.	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I	  am	  describing	  an	  old	  problem,	  settled	  in	  the	  earliest	  explorations	  of	  the	  ecocritical	  project	  and	  still	  repeated	  
now.	   	   	   Suggesting	   that	   ecocriticism—a	   project	   whose	   difficulty	   to	   define	   is	   demonstrated	   by	   its	   repeated	  
attempts	  at	  self-­‐definition,	  as	  Simon	  Estok	  and	  Terry	  Gifford	  suggest—has	  been	  predicated	  on	  	  a	  contradiction	  
between	   its	  politically-­‐activist	   “eco”	  and	  English-­‐department-­‐disciplinary	  “critical”	   terms	   is	   itself	  more	   than	  a	  
decade	   old.	   	   In	   an	   early	   exploratory	   essay,	   Lance	   Newman	   defines	   ecocriticism	   as	   “a	   movement	   based	   in	  
university	   literature	  departments,	  but	  one	   that	   is	  ambitious	   to	   reach	  beyond	   them,	   in	  order	   to	  accomplish	  a	  
most	   serious	   and	   important	   goal:	   	   transformation	   of	   human	   relations	   with	   nature”	   (2).	   	   Positing	   that	   this	  
relationship	   is	   demonstrably	   botched	   under	   present	   conditions	   is	   a	   position	   that	   needs	   no	   justification,	   but	  
analyses	  of	  the	  ultimate	  and	  proximate	  causes	  of	  this	  slow-­‐motion	  disaster	  and	  attempts	  to	  imagine	  ways	  out	  
of	   it	  remain	  contested.	   	  According	  to	  Newman,	  ecocritics	  tend	  to	  diagnose	  the	  problem	  idealistically,	  arguing	  
that	   “[t]he	  problem	   is	  bad	   ideas”	   insofar	  as	   “the	   leading	   ideas	   in	   society	  determine	  how	   it	   is	   structured	  and	  
how	  it	  evolves	  through	  time”	  (2),	  a	  position	  to	  be	  contrasted	  against	  the	  materialist	  view	  that	  ideas	  arise	  in	  the	  
process	   of	   activities	   rooted	   in	   human	  will-­‐to-­‐power	   and	  need,	   and	  not	   the	   reverse.	   	   Following	   this	   idealistic	  
diagnosis,	  most	  ecocritics	  prescribe	   themselves	  “the	   task	  of	  changing	  our	  minds,	  of	  convincing	  us	   to	   think	   in	  
ways	  that	  will,	  in	  turn,	  change	  how	  we	  behave,	  both	  individually	  and	  as	  a	  society”	  (3).	  	  A	  clear-­‐eyed	  survey	  of	  
significant	   and	   representative	   ecocritical	   projects,	   work	   that	   may	   not	   itself	   be	   current	   (especially	   since	   the	  
watershed	  that	  was	  Tim	  Morton's	  Ecology	  Without	  Nature)	  but	  still	  carries	  the	  weight	  of	  ecocritical	  authority,	  
suggest	   that	   the	   very	   conditions	   Newman	   describes—a	   contradictory	   coupling	   of	   conservative	   disciplinary	  
cultures	   and	   means	   with	   transformational,	   even	   revolutionary	   aspirations—have	   tended	   to	   make	   some	  
Journal	  of	  Ecocriticism	  4(2)	  July	  2012	  
	  
Natura	  Naturans	  (34-­‐47)	   	   36	  
canonical	   and	   frequently-­‐cited	   ecocritics	   actively	   hostile	   to	   critical	   social	   method	   while	   simultaneously	  
producing	   concepts	   that	   productively	   open	   onto	   a	   contribution	   to	   such	   a	   critical	  method.	   	   Such	   a	   survey	   is	  
beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  work6,	  but	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  milieu	  out	  of	  which	  this	  preliminary	  work	  
emerged:	   	   the	   discipline	   of	   reading	   certain	   kinds	   of	   texts	   in	   certain	   disciplined	   ways,	   in	   order	   to	   convince	  
readers	   also	   disciplined	   by	   the	   discipline	   of	   something	   that	   is	   germane	   to	   the	   discipline	   or	   its	   designated	  
objects.	  
	  
By	   contrast,	   Newman	   finds	   this	   prescription—to	   change	  minds	   by	   explicating	   texts	   in	   a	   particular	   way	   and	  
thereby	  change	  ethics—unacceptable	  or	  at	  best	  incomplete	  as	  a	  program	  for	  an	  effective	  ecological	  politics.	  	  To	  
explain	  why	  he	  gives	  a	  brief	  cultural	  history	  showing	  how	  this	  paradigm	  arose:	  	  “Ecocriticism’s	  reluctance	  so	  far	  
to	   recognize	   the	   social	   world	   as	   an	   active	   force	   in	   its	   tale	   of	   a	   solitary	   visionary	   wandering	   in	   the	   woods,”	  
Newman	   argues,	   evoking	   the	   ecocritically-­‐contested	   trope	   of	   the	   contemplative	   and	   transcendent	   Romantic	  
poet,	   “reveals	   the	   incompleteness	   of	   its	   departure	   from	   the	   historiographical	   idealism	   of	   orthodox	   literary	  
studies	   and	   cultural	   analysis”	   (10).	   	   Consequently,	   “[m]ost	   believe	   that	   such	   things	   as	   deforestation	   and	  
pollution	   are	   symptoms	   of	   a	   society	   in	   which	   our	   ethical	   priorities	   have	   been	   disordered	   by	   a	   culture	   of	  
materialism,	  a	  tradition	  of	  humanism,	  or	  the	  Pure	  of	  another	  ideological	  misalignment,”	  and	  therefore	  work	  to	  
bring	  about	  “a	  realignment	  that	  will	  be	  accomplished	  above	  all	  by	  rethinking	  or	  reimagining	  nature”	  (Newman	  
10-­‐11).	  	  Newman	  argues	  that	  this	  view	  is	  in	  fact	  “not	  ecological	  enough”	  and,	  by	  inference,	  uncritical;	  Newman	  
prefers	  instead	  to	  “explain	  why	  the	  habits	  of	  thought	  and	  action	  that	  we	  deplore	  became	  and	  remain	  dominant	  
within	   this	   specific	   ecosocial	   order”	   (11),	   which	   is	   to	   say,	   Newman	   proposes	  Marxist	   critical	   practice	   as	   an	  
alternative	  in	  this	  context,	  with	  the	  broad	  aim	  “to	  bring	  under	  democratic	  control	  decisions	  not	  only	  about	  how	  
much	   to	   produce,	   but	   also	   what	   we	   produce	   and	   how”	   (13).	   	   Newman	   concludes	   that	   ecocriticism	   must	  
embrace	  Marxist	  critical	  social	  theory	  because	  “[e]nvironmental	  commitment	  is	  finally	  a	  matter	  of	  consciously	  
attempting	   to	   change	   the	   most	   basic	   structures	   of	   social	   power,”	   because	   “the	   same	   forces	   that	   generate	  
exploitation	  and	  oppression,	  generate	  ecological	  damage”	  (21).	  
	  
Here,	  Newman's	  position	  represents	  a	   longstanding	  and	  valuable	  strand	  of	  ecocritical	  thought.	   	  That	   is,	  there	  
has	  long	  existed	  in	  ecocritical	  and	  bioregional	  thought	  a	  strong	  imperative	  to	  political	  transformation	  that	  is,	  at	  
minimum,	   compatible	   with	   the	   social	   diagnoses	   of	   Marxist	   critical	   theory,	   which,	   as	   David	   Layfield	   shows,	  
locates	  ecological	  crises	  and	  social	  injustices	  squarely	  in	  the	  social	  relations	  and	  regimes	  of	  accumulation	  that	  
prevail	  under	  capital.	  	  For	  instance,	  Sivaramakrishnan—in	  an	  attempt	  to	  defend	  the	  value	  of	  transhistorical	  and	  
idealist	   positioning	   for	   ecocritical	  work—quotes	   Patrick	  Murphy's	   1998	   summary	  of	  Gary	   Snyder's	   ecological	  
politics:	  	  “'The	  ecosystem	  culture	  is	  attentive	  to	  local	  particularity	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  heterogeneity,	  while	  the	  
biosphere	   culture	   relentlessly	   attempts	   to	   homogenize	   the	   peoples	   of	   the	   world	   in	   the	   interests	   of	  
transnational	   economics'”	   (304).	   	   If	   one	   replaces	   the	   word	   “culture”	   with	   the	   phrase	   “social	   formation”—a	  
reasonable	   thing	   to	   do,	   since	   “culture”	   here	   does	   the	   work	   “social	   formation”	   does	   in	   Marxist	   political	  
economy—then	  Murphy	  and	  Snyder	  become	  radicals	  and	  their	  words	  become	  indistinguishable	  from	  ecological	  
Marxism,	  and	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  the	  context	  of	  bioregionalism	  (Anderson,	  2012)	  this	  is	  a	  virtue,	  and	  should	  not	  
be	  dismissed	  as	  mere	  “constructivism”	  (Love,	  2003).	  
	  
Newman’s	   proposal,	   while	   offering	   a	   sound	   and	   still	   relevant	   diagnosis	   of	   anthologized	   ecocriticism’s	  
constitutive	   contradiction,	   goes	   further	   correctly	   that	   a	   dialectical	   theory	   can	   resolve	   this	   contradiction	  
between	   the	   imperative	   to	   revolutionize	   the	   relationship	   presently	   obtaining	   between	   the	   socius	   and	   the	  
material	   on	   one	   side	   and	   the	   resistance	   to	   theorizing	   the	   grounds,	   the	   means,	   or	   the	   ends	   of	   such	   a	  
transformation	   on	   the	   other,	   embracing	   instead	   a	   nostalgic	   or	   idealistic	   project.	   	   This	   distinction	   can	   be	  
understood	  in	  terms	  of	  temporality:	  	  where	  does	  the	  ecocritic	  presume	  him	  or	  herself	  to	  be	  situated	  in	  time—
in	   an	   abstract	   Now	   of	   reflection	   or	   unproblematic	   objectivity,	   or	   embedded	   in	   a	   dialectical	   process	   of	  
emergence?	  	  The	  latter	  possibility	  opens	  onto	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  contradiction	  Newman	  observes.	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For	  the	  sake	  of	  full	  disclosure,	  I	  should	  point	  out	  two	  assumptions	  I	  make	  moving	  forward:	  	  first,	  that	  matter	  is	  
real	   in	   its	   own	   way,	   and	   consequently,	   it	   is	   comprehensible	   if	   not	   completely	   or	   perfectly	   so	   by	   reason	   or	  
imagination,	   and	   even	   if	   our	   apprehensions	   of	   it	   and	   concepts	   for	   it	   do	   not	   necessarily	   or	   consistently	  
correspond	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  reality	  they	  may	  present.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  shapes	  of	  things	  that	  appear	  before	  our	  senses	  
may	  objectively	  be	  dynamic	  processes	  or	  static	  wave	  forms,	  for	   instance,	  but	  subjectively	  they	  correspond	  to	  
conventional	   designations.	   	   I	  make	   this	   assumption	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   predictability:	   	   one	   plants	   a	   viable	   seed	  
under	  known	  conditions,	  and	  it	  not	  only	  sprouts,	  but	  may	  produce	  fruit	  that	  reproduces	  the	  seed	  from	  which	  it	  
grew:	  	  apples	  to	  apples.	  	  This	  extends	  into	  the	  conventions	  of	  ordinary	  life	  as	  well;	  if	  you	  come	  to	  my	  home	  and	  
ask	  me	  for	  a	  bottle	  of	  ale	  or	  a	  mug	  of	  coffee,	  we	  both	  know	  more	  or	  less	  what	  to	  expect	  of	  the	  container	  and	  
the	  liquid.	  	  However,	  the	  creative	  work	  of	  nature,	  the	  living	  body	  of	  this	  planet,	  is	  not	  to	  be	  taken	  at	  face	  value	  
as	  a	  set	  of	  finished	  and	  homogenized	  commodities,	  	  as	  static,	  finished,	  cold,	  or	  other	  to	  Spirit	  and	  hence	  to	  be	  
transcended.	  	  I	  understand	  it	  as	  a	  very	  complex	  matrix	  of	  processes	  in	  time.	  	  From	  this	  assumption,	  I	  claim	  an	  
inquiry	  into	  the	  conditions	  of	  consciousness	  that	  make	  an	  apprehension	  of	  this	  process	  possible	  is	  warranted.	  	  
Secondly,	  I	  assume	  that	  such	  a	  critical	  consciousness	  is	  possible	  and	  real	  but	  not	  a	  given—which	  is	  another	  way	  
to	  say	  that	  I	  assume	  learning	  is	  possible	  but	  not	  inevitable.	  	  This	  is	  a	  premise	  I	  will	  return	  to	  in	  a	  recursive,	  but	  
hopefully	   not	   circular,	   argument.	   	   Both	   these	   assumptions	   have	   a	   history	   in	   ecocritical	   thought	   under	   the	  
concept	  of	  “natura	  naturans”	  or	  “nature	  naturing.”	  
	  
In	  an	  exemplary	  instance	  of	  such	  thinking,	  Frederick	  Turner	  (1996)	  objects	  to	  the	  ideological	  uses	  to	  which	  the	  
conventional	   nature/culture	   split	   is	   put,	   and	   proposes	   instead	   to	   understand	   the	   forms	   of	   human	  
consciousness	  and	  practice	  we	  call	  “culture”	  as	  itself	  of	  nature,	  taking	  the	  The	  Winter's	  Tale	  (a	  time-­‐saturated	  
document	  to	  be	  sure)	  as	  his	  point	  of	  departure.	  	  Shakespeare,	  Turner	  claims,	  “insists	  that	  human	  art	  is	  not	  only	  
a	  product	  of	  nature,	  but	  one	  of	  the	  creative	  instruments	  of	  nature	  doing	  what	  it	  does.	  	  We	  are	  natura	  naturans,	  
nature	  naturing”	  (42).	  	  The	  gerund	  form	  of	  this	  claim	  is	  significant:	  	  culture	  is	  nature	  is	  naturing,	  indicating	  an	  
ongoing	  and	  continuing	  process	  in	  objective	  time.	  	  Nature	  has	  a	  tempo	  independent	  of	  subjective	  experiences	  
of	  temporality,	  which	  may	  be	  evident	  in	  the	  archive	  of	  natural	  history	  and	  cultural	  production.	  	  Here,	  I	  should	  
observe	   that	   the	   very	   concept	   of	   objective	   time,	   even	   in	   the	   purview	   of	   critical	   philosophy,	   is	   hardly	   an	  
innocent	  or	  uncontested	  one.	  I	  address	  this	  problem	  and	  suggest	  an	  alternative	  context	  for	  it	  in	  the	  conclusion	  
to	  this	  essay.	  
	  
To	  explore	  Turner's	  idea	  further,	  one	  may	  observe	  that	  one	  characteristic	  of	  the	  world	  inhabited	  by	  people	  is	  
that	   it	   is	   representable,	   that	   we	   can	   learn	   from	   it	   and	   reproduce	   that	   learning	   to	   others	   in	   ways	   that	   are	  
themselves	  reproducible,	  and	  in	  a	  sense	  this	  learning	  and	  reproduction	  of	  learning	  amounts	  to	  nature	  learning	  
from	  itself—and	  from	  that	  learning,	  can	  come	  to	  transform	  itself	  in	  correspondence	  to	  the	  “art”	  produced	  and	  
prevailing	   in	  a	  given	  social	   formation.	   	   “Art”	   in	  Shakespearean	  English	  has	  an	  affiliation	   to	  work,	  production,	  
and	   labor	   in	   addition	   to	   representation	   and	   creativity	   or	   artifice.	   	   If,	   as	   Turner	   suggests,	   “we”	   are	   “nature	  
naturing,”	   we	   are	   involved	   in	   feeding	   and	   reproducing	   ourselves	   in	   a	   direct	   way,	   through	   our	   labors	   and	  
interactions	  with	  each	  other;	  the	  plural	  pronoun	  is	  not	  incidental,	  because	  as	  Karl	  Marx	  (but	  not	  only	  Marx)	  was	  
correct	   to	   insist	   from	  1844	  onwards,	   labor	   is	  social	   labor,	  and	  the	  human	  metabolism	  with	  nature	   is	  shaped,	  
constituted,	  conditioned	  by	  social	  activity	  in	  social	  formations7.	  	  Most	  fundamentally,	  natura	  naturans	  points	  to	  
the	   reproduction	  of	   life	  as	   such,	  biological	   life	  as	  well	  as	  more	  capable	  or	  creative	   life.	   	   I	   call	   this	  vulnerable,	  
precarious	   totality	  of	   relations	  and	  potentials	  among	  beings	   in	  necessary	   relation	   to	  each	  other	   the	  Very	  Big	  
Body,	  and	  argue	  elsewhere	   for	   it	   to	  be	   taken	  as	   the	  object	  of	   specifically	  political	   responsibility	  by	  ecocritics	  
(Anderson,	  “Accumulating-­‐Capital”).	  	  Life	  in	  time,	  the	  tempo	  of	  objective	  nature,	  can	  premise	  an	  environmental	  
politics.	  	  Look	  for	  yourself	  and	  see	  that	  time	  is	  short.	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Turner's	  essay	  is	  also	  directed	  in	  another,	  equally	  significant	  direction,	  toward	  a	  reality-­‐making	  activity.	  	  While	  
natura	  naturans	  is	  a	  concept	  introduced	  in	  Spinoza's	  Ethics,	  it	  is	  also	  taken	  up	  in	  adaptations	  of	  German	  Idealist	  
categories	   from	   their	   habitat	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   nature,	   where	   Samuel	   Taylor	   Coleridge	   found	   them8,	   to	  
contemporary	   ecological	   thought,	   as	   in	   Kate	   Rigby's	   exploration	   of	   Schelling9.	   	   This	   concerns	   the	   subjective	  
apperception	  of	  objective	  temporality	  in	  nature,	  including	  the	  sense	  of	  crisis.	  The	  relation	  of	  nature	  naturing	  to	  
labor	  and	  creativity	  as	  a	  way	  to	  specify	  it	   into	  a	  theory	  of	  time	  in	  and	  of	  consciousness	  as	  well	  as	  matter,	  the	  
categories	  of	   “subject”	  and	  “object”	   in	  dialectical	  and	  hence	  processual	   relation	  with	  each	  other,	   should	   	  be	  
emphasized.	   	   Admittedly,	   this	   is	   presented	   in	   much	   the	   same	   enlightenment	   tradition	   as	   the	   problem	   of	  
transcendent	  critical	  and	  aesthetic	   judgment;	  however,	   I	   think	   it	  more	  than	  plausible	  that	  Hegel's	  categories,	  
especially	  the	  dialectic	  of	  matter,	  can	  be	  taken	  critically	  and	  not	  idealistically10.	  	  I	  will	  describe	  this	  through	  the	  
concepts	   of	   labor,	   care,	   and	  praxis	   as	   they	   are	  developed	   in	   Kosik's	  Dialectic	   of	   the	  Concrete,	   a	   text	  which	   I	  
hope	   to	   show	   has	   a	   contribution	   to	   make	   to	   contemporary	   ecological	   critique	   in	   the	   way	   it	   deploys	   those	  
categories.	  
	  
This	  contribution	  follows	  on	  a	  question:	  	  what	  happens	  when	  the	  conventional	  sense	  of	  temporality	  does	  not	  
correspond	   to	   the	   objective	   tempo	   of	   social	   and	   natural	   history,	   as	   in	   the	   willful	   blindness	   to	   the	  material	  
consequences	  of	  the	  nuclear	  arms	  race	  on	  both	  sides	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  or	  to	  the	  present	  cultural	  milieu	  of	  
climate	  change	  denial	  and	  correlated	  opposition	  to	  proper	  science	  education	  in	  public	  schools	  in	  the	  U.S.?	  
Labor,	  Objectification,	  and	  the	  Feeling	  of	  Temporality	  
Stuart	  Hall	   (1980)	  once	  productively	  described	  culture	  as	  a	  “dialectic	  between	  conditions	  and	  consciousness”	  
(79)11.	  	  Eco-­‐	  (conditions)	  and	  –criticism	  (consciousness).	  	  In	  specifying	  both	  terms	  of	  this	  formula	  for	  ecocritical	  
purposes,	  the	  category	  of	  conditions	  takes	  in	  the	  complex	  totality	  of	  material	  (biological,	  social)	  determinants	  
brought	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   mind	   and	   the	   senses,	   and	   that	   also	   function	   as	   their	   substrate	   and	   condition	   of	  
possibility:	  	  the	  web	  of	  life,	  complete,	  and	  the	  given	  local	  bioregion	  in	  particular12.	  	  Remembering	  that	  mind	  is	  
in	  important	  ways	  matter,	  and	  that	  mindstuff	  is	  contingent	  on	  culture	  and	  experience,	  consciousness	  is	  better	  
understood	   not	   as	   Mind-­‐as-­‐such	   nor	   as	   pure	   subjective	   interiority,	   but	   rather	   as	   the	   repertoire	   of	   forms	  
consciousness	   takes,	   inclusive	   of	   critical	   consciousness	   and	   compassionate	   responses.	   	   In	   terms	   of	   a	   subject	  
apprehending	  an	  object,	  a	  reciprocal	  relation	  obtains:	  	  the	  history	  of	  the	  apprehending	  subject	  determines	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  a	  form	  presented	  to	  the	  senses	  may	  be	  understood;	  the	  same	  silhouette	  may	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  
an	  umbrella	  by	  a	  Portlander,	  a	  palm	  tree	  by	  a	  Los	  Angelino,	  or	  a	  shiitake	  mushroom	  to	  a	  resident	  of	  Sapporo.	  	  
These	   canalized	  mental	   formations	   are	   social	   in	   nature	   and	   produced	   by	   particular	   historical	   forces,	   by	   the	  
things	  people	  do	  to	  survive	  and	  thrive	  (labor	  and	  creative	  action),	  the	  sites	  in	  which	  they	  do	  it	  (bioregions	  and	  
built	  environments),	  and	  they	  ways	  they	  learn	  to	  do	  it.	  	  They	  are	  inflected	  and	  often	  determined	  by	  relations	  of	  
power;	   Georg	   Lukacs'	   description	   of	   this	   “false	   consciousness”	   as	   “second	   nature”	   (Kosik	   calls	   it	   the	  
“pseudoconcrete”)	   is	   in	   this	   instance	   both	   evocative	   and	   accurate	   insofar	   as	   a	   particular	   social	   regime	  
promotes	  forms	  of	  consciousness	  that	  are	   intended	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo13:	   	  “intelligent	  design”	  serves	  
the	   end	   of	   petro-­‐capitalism	   insofar	   as	   it	   helps	   put	   the	   brakes	   on	   meaningful	   climate	   politics,	   and	   hence	  
produces	  a	  mismatch	  between	  the	   felt	   sense	  of	   time	   (everything	   is	   fine)	  and	   the	   inevitable	  consequences	  of	  
social	  actions	  (Dhaka	  will	  drown	  as	  sea	  levels	  rise).	  	  	  
The	  immediate	  point	  is	  that	  both	  the	  forms	  of	  consciousness	  made	  available	  to	  a	  given	  subject	  (mindstuff)	  and	  
the	   objects	   presented	   to	   that	   subject’s	   consciousness	   (things)	   can	   be	   assumed	   to	   be	   products	   of	   historical	  
processes	   on	   cultural	   and	   evolutionary	   scales	   of	   time,	   which	   is	   to	   say	   that	   the	   edge	   between	   the	   two	  
constitutes	  a	  site	  of	  action	  from	  which	  productive	  ecocritical	  work	  can	  emerge	  because	   it	   is	   the	  point	  where	  
the	  objective	  tempo	  of	  history	  meets	  the	  subjective	  productions	  of	  consciousness,	  where	  the	  two	  interact	  and	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co-­‐constitute	   each	  other.	   	  This	   is	   the	  context	   in	  which	   I	  draw	   in	  Kosik’s	  analysis	  of	   labor,	  objectification,	  and	  
temporality.	  	  	  
Kosik	  describes	  this	  co-­‐constitution	  of	  consciousness	  and	  conditions	  as	  follows:	  	  “the	  only	  reality	  of	  the	  human	  
world	  is	  the	  unity	  of	  empirical	  conditions,	  complete	  with	  the	  process	  of	  forming	  them,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  of	  
transient	  or	  living	  values	  and	  their	  formative	  process,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  The	  particular	  historical	  character	  of	  reality	  
determines	  whether	  this	  unity	  is	  realized	  as	  a	  harmony	  of	  incarnated	  values,	  that	  is	  through	  conditions	  infused	  
with	  values,	  or	  as	  a	  split	  between	  empty,	  invalidated	  empiricism	  and	  ideal	  transcendental	  values”	  (84).	  	  This	  is	  
not	  merely	  a	  methodological	  matter,	  as	  Kosik's	  diction	  implies.	  	  This	  objectification	  also	  describes	  everyday	  life	  
insofar	   as	   material	   life	   (eating	   and	   breathing,	   and	   hence	   working)	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   sense	   of	   temporality	   in	  
ordinary	   life	  conditions.	   	   It	  also	  opens	  onto	  a	  useful	  distinction	  between	  embodied	  forms	  of	  consciousness	   in	  
which	   mindstuff	   corresponds	   to	   real	   needs	   and	   possibilities	   on	   one	   side,	   and	   the	   varieties	   of	   false	  
consciousness	  or	  “second	  nature”	  also	  in	  circulation	  on	  another.	  
	  
Because	  consciousness	  may	  take	  variable	  and	  often	  worse	  than	  useless	  forms,	  the	  natural	  world	  is	  experienced	  
and	  apprehended	  in	  fundamentally	  divergent	  ways—perhaps	  as	  an	  object	  of	  idealization,	  perhaps	  as	  a	  field	  of	  
resources	  to	  exploit.	  	  “Nature	  thus	  appears	  to	  man	  in	  a	  double	  light,”	  Kosik	  claims:	  	  “it	  stands	  out	  as	  a	  power	  
and	  an	  objectivity	  that	  has	  to	  be	  respected,	  whose	  laws	  have	  to	  be	  recognized	  so	  that	  man	  may	  use	  them	  to	  his	  
own	   advantage,	   yet	   sinks	   to	   the	   level	   of	  mere	  material	   in	   which	   human	   intentions	   are	   realized”	   (121-­‐122).	  	  
Present	  activity	  becomes	  a	  product	  of	  the	  past	  processes,	  objectified	  and	  quantifiable	  like	  a	  set	  of	  commodities	  
on	  a	  spreadsheet	  or	  in	  a	  retail	  shop,	  an	  object:	  	  this	  is	  why	  objectification	  is	  called	  objectification.	  	  	  
	  
The	  same	  logic	  also	  describes	  subjectification,	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  subjects	  are	  shaped,	  formed,	  and	  have	  
their	   being	   as	   objects	   by	   determinants	   eternal	   to	   mind	   such	   as	   social	   formations	   and	   material	   contexts.	  	  
Consequently,	   it	   is	   from	   the	   process	   of	   objectification	   at	   the	   site	   of	   labor	   that	   the	   felt	   sense	   of	   temporality	  
emerges	   as	   Kosik	   describes	   it:	   	   “In	   the	   labor	   process,	   results	   of	   past	   labor	   are	   transformed	   while	   realizing	  
intentions	  of	  the	  future.	  	  The	  three-­‐dimensionality	  of	  human	  time	  as	  a	  constitutive	  dimension	  of	  man's	  being	  is	  
anchored	  in	  labor	  as	  man's	  objective	  doing.	  	  The	  three-­‐dimensionality	  of	  time	  and	  the	  temporality	  of	  man	  are	  
based	  on	  objectification.	  	  Without	  objectification,	  there	  is	  no	  temporality”	  (Kosik	  122).	  	  The	  site	  and	  conditions	  
of	   labor,	   necessary	   to	   the	   reproduction	   of	   	   biological	   and	   social	   life,	   is	   understood	   as	   the	   machine	   of	  
objectification:	  	  the	  forms	  labor	  takes	  determine	  the	  forms	  by	  which	  societies	  objectify,	  which	  in	  term	  determine	  
the	  contours	  of	  time	  which	  are	  representable	  or	  available	  to	  consciousness	  in	  the	  same	  society.	  	  	  
	  
Kosik's	   invocation	   of	   “past	   labors”	   directs	   attention	   to	   the	   metabolism	   of	   human	   activity	   and	   material,	  
bioregional	   conditions,	   ably	   described	   by	   Alfred	   Schmidt.	   	   Volcanic	   activity	   and	   erosion	   transform	   past	  
geological	   formations	   but	  without	   intentionality	   for	   a	   future	   shape;	   the	   geological	   formation	  we	   call	  Mount	  
Lassen	   simply	   Lassens	   itself	   into	   being	  without	   intention	   or	   cooperation.	   	   This	   is	   how	   the	   felt	   experience	   of	  
human	  time	  differs	   from	  the	  time	  of	  biospheres	  on	  one	  scale,	  or	  geological	   formations	  on	  another.	   	  Labor	   is	  
also	  significant	  as	  the	  site	  in	  which	  the	  forms	  of	  objectification	  emerge	  and	  are	  disciplined	  in	  that	  it	  opens	  onto	  
a	  consideration	  of	  how	  a	  society	  can	  assume	  a	  relation	  of	  responsibility	  or	  care	  for	  a	  site	  or	  a	  planet,	  beginning	  
with	   responsibility	   for	   the	   fundamental	   and	   vulnerable	   life-­‐conditions	   a	   bioregion	   may	   offer	   (Anderson,	  
“Accumulating-­‐Capital).	  	  It	  should	  be	  emphasized	  that	  in	  Kosik's	  description,	  the	  relation	  to	  nature	  that	  prevails	  
in	  labor	  under	  capitalist	  social	  relations,	  in	  which	  the	  living	  process	  of	  a	  bioregion	  is	  transformed	  into	  an	  inert	  
object	  of	  consumption	  and,	  for	  the	  few	  empowered	  to	  make	  decisions	  about	  these	  relations,	  the	  accumulation	  
of	   capital—is	   the	   metabolism	   of	   time.	   	   Which	   is	   to	   say,	   Kosik's	   understanding	   of	   temporality	   is	   already	  
ecocritical	  insofar	  as	  it	  emerges	  from	  a	  description	  of	  that	  relation	  of	  social	  practices	  to	  the	  natural	  world.	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Significantly	   for	   a	   green	   cultural	   studies,	   Kosik	   presents	   labor	   and	   collaborative	   activity	   as	   the	   point	   of	  
mediation	   between	   nature	   and	   culture.	   	   Kosik	   at	   once	   situates	   his	   argument	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   nature	  
naturing,	  but	  also	  moves	  to	  complicate	  it:	  	  “Man	  is	  a	  component	  of	  nature	  and	  is	  himself	  nature.	  	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  though,	  he	  is	  a	  being	  which,	  having	  mastered	  both	  'external'	  and	  his	  own	  natures,	  forms	  a	  new	  reality	  in	  
nature,	   one	   that	   is	   irreducible	   to	   the	   latter”	   (71).	   	   This	   novelty	   can	   be	   suggested	   by	   reference	   to	   cultural	  
practices	   and	   products.	   	   For	   instance,	   to	   return	   to	   Turner's	   example,	   The	   Winter's	   Tale	   as	   a	   cultural	  
phenomenon	  cannot	  be	  explained	   in	  an	   integral	  or	  complete	  way	  only	  by	  reference	  to	   its	  historical	  origin,	   in	  
and	  of	  particular	  bodies	  at	  a	  certain	  time.	  	  Its	  history,	  inclusive	  of	  its	  reception,	  reproduction,	  and	  the	  creative	  
uses	   to	  which	   it	  has	  been	  put,	   is	   longer	  and	  broader	   than	   the	   text's	  moment	  of	  arising,	   and	   for	   this	   reason,	  
categories	  such	  as	  culture	  and	  consciousness	  are	  necessary	  to	  describe	  it.	   	  When	  read	  in	  this	  context,	  Kosik's	  
invocation	   of	   the	   discourse	   of	   nature-­‐mastery	   so	   familiar	   in	   dialectical	   materialism	   since	   Friedrich	   Engels'	  
Dialectic	   of	  Nature	   emerges	  with	   an	   entirely	   different	   set	   of	  meanings.	   	  Where	   in	   Engels	   such	   a	  mastery	   of	  
natural	   productive	   forces	   by	   social	   man	   is	   optimistically	   assumed	   to	   be	   both	   possible	   and	   good,	   an	  
anthropocentric	   and	   short-­‐sighted	   position	   unacceptable	   to	   both	   ecocritics	   and	   ecologically-­‐oriented	  
Marxists14,	   Kosik,	   as	   Mildred	   Bakan	   argues,	   puts	   his	   optimism	   elsewhere.	   	   In	   Bakan's	   interpretation,	   “man,	  
recovering	  himself	  intellectually	  as	  natura	  naturans,	  understands	  himself	  as	  creative	  and	  vital,	  in	  his	  own	  being	  
integrated	   with	   nature	   as	   making	   itself”	   (80).	   	   Mastery	   here	   implies	   creativity	   and	   purposiveness—as	   in	  
mastery	  of	  a	  craft	  or	  a	  discipline	  as	  a	  precondition	  of	  making	  something	  new—rather	  than	  mastery	  as	  control,	  
domination,	  or	  exploitation.	  	  In	  the	  nondual	  context	  of	  nature	  naturing,	  “mastery”	  connotes	  a	  view	  of	  human	  
social	  agency	  as	  a	  function	  of	  nature	  as	  competent	  to,	  and	  increasingly	  skillful	  in,	  learning	  how	  to	  care	  for	  itself.	  
	  
“Mastery”	   thus	   understood	   opens	   onto	   a	   problem	   that,	   in	   my	   view	   (in	   “Critical	   Bioregionalist	   Method”),	   a	  
critical	  approach	  to	  green	  cultural	  studies,	  critical	  ecocriticism	  or	  bioregionalism,	  can	  address.	  	  Nature	  natures	  
through	  determination,	   through	  necessity:	   	  you	  have	  a	  body	  that	  must	  be	  cared	   for	  and	  has	  certain	  minimal	  
conditions	  even	  for	  bare	  existence.	  	  This	  is	  the	  “given”	  that	  is	  nature,	  recalling	  Timpanaro's	  diction.	  	  Such	  are	  
the	  conditions.	  	  But	  what	  of	  consciousness,	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  care,	  for	  managing	  necessity?	  	  As	  I	  
have	  already	  observed,	  human	  subjects	  have	  an	   imperfect,	  baffled	  understanding	  of	   their	   situation	  variously	  
characterized	  in	  cultural	  studies	  as	  false	  consciousness,	  false	  nature,	  the	  spectacle,	  or	  ideology.	  	  G.I.	  Gurdjieff	  
describes	   the	   double	   bind,	   an	   imperative	   to	   be	   aware	   and	   take	   care	   on	   one	   side	   against	   the	   mechanical	  
determinations	   within	   and	   without	   the	   human	   subject	   as	   “The	   Terror	   of	   the	   Situation”	   in	   his	   baffling	   and	  
hilarious	   puzzle	   of	   a	   novel,	   Beelzebub's	   Tales	   to	   his	   Grandson.	   	   Kosik	   presents	   it	   in	   his	   concept	   of	   the	  
pseudoconcrete.	   	   In	  Kosik's	  hands,	  L.	  Roland	  Irons	  argues,	  “the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  consciousness	  
are	   situated	   in	   everyday	   life”	   (167),	   where	   the	   contradictions	   of	   the	   capitalist	   social	   formation	   are	   a	   felt	  
reality—as	   are	   their	   ideological	   distortion.	   	   According	   to	   Irons,	   under	   such	   a	   regime,	   “individuals	   become	  
preoccupied	  with	  the	  future	  of	  their	  present	  state	  of	  utility,	  and	  the	  results	  of	  planning	  for	  the	  future	  become	  
mechanically	  derived	  from	  the	  given	  system	  rather	  than	  dialectically	  structured	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  'free'	  social	  
activity”	  (174),	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  forms	  of	  consciousness	  become	  objectified,	  and	  the	  horizon	  of	  imaginable	  
possibilities	   and	   values	   becomes	   reduced	   and	   recursively	   bent	   into	  mechanical	   habit	   or	   regimes	   of	   external	  
control,	  and	  away	  from	  the	  capacity	  to	  work	  creatively	  and	  collaboratively	   in	  a	  relation	  of	  care.	   	  These	  forms	  
serve	  as	   immaterial	  means	   to	   reproduce	  material	   results,	   the	  maintenance	  of	   the	  present	  order.	   	  This	   is	   the	  
kind	  of	  false	  consciousness	  Kosik	  characterizes	  as	  “pseudoconcrete,”	  described	  as	  a	  “chiaroscuro	  of	  truth	  and	  
deceit”	  (Kosik	  2).	   	   It	   is	  “[t]he	  collection	  of	  phenomena	  that	  crowd	  the	  everyday	  environment	  and	  the	  routine	  
atmosphere	   of	   human	   life,	   and	   which	   penetrate	   the	   consciousness	   of	   acting	   individuals	   with	   a	   regularity,	  
immediacy,	   and	   self-­‐evidence	   that	   lend	   them	   a	   semblance	   of	   autonomy	   and	   naturalness”	   (2).	   	   The	  
reproduction	   and	   objectification	   of	   these	   repertoires	   of	   seeming	   necessity	   produces	   the	   problem	   of	   false	  
consciousness,	   which	   can	   be	   addressed	   through	   critical	   consciousness	   at	   their	   point	   of	   production,	   hence	  
making	  it	  possible	  to	  address	  the	  causes	  of	  crisis	  in	  addition	  lamenting	  their	  results.	  	  How	  so?	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Care	  and	  Critical	  Praxis	  
Invoking	   the	   problematic	   of	   care	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   discourse	   of	   care,	  work-­‐making,	   and	   time	  may,	   at	   first	  
glance,	   imply	   an	   inscription	  of	  Martin	  Heidegger's	   description	  of	   fallenness—care	   as	  Sorge,	   trouble,	  worry15.	  	  
While	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  Kosik	  may	  have	  been	   influenced	  by	  Heidegger's	  thinking,	  Kosik's	  concept	  of	  care	   is	  both	  
more	  prosaic	  and	  more	  optimistic	  than	  Heidegger's:	  	  “Care	  is	  not	  the	  everyday	  consciousness	  of	  the	  struggling	  
individual,	  one	  that	  he	  would	  shed	  during	  leisure.	  	  Care	  is	  the	  practical	  involvement	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  a	  tangle	  
of	  social	  relations	  conceived	  from	  the	  position	  of	  his	  personal	  individual,	  subjective	  involvement”	  (37).	  	  It	  is	  less	  
an	  imposition	  than	  a	  commitment,	  even	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  heart,	  a	  practice	  of	  love,	  by	  which	  the	  metabolism	  of	  
everyday	  life	  and	  its	  preconditions	  are	  cared	  for.	  	  Kosik	  is	  optimistically	  describing	  a	  world	  in	  which	  critical	  and	  
creative	  praxis	   is	  possible,	   in	  which	  natura	  naturans	  opens	  onto	  a	  space	  of	   increased	  creativity	  and	   lessened	  
necessity	   through	   collaborative	   and	   creative	   social	   action:	   	   self-­‐aware	   and	   hence	   critical,	   not	  mechanical	   or	  
externally	  manipulated	  and	  exploitative,	  activity.	  	  Kosik	  defines	  praxis	  as	  “the	  creative	  activity	  of	  mankind”	  (84),	  
the	  creative	  work	  impacting	  the	  relation	  of	  consciousness	  to	  historical	  conditions:	  	  both	  the	  formation	  of	  them,	  
but	  also	  the	  representation	  and	  transformation	  of	  them	  (Kosik	  112).	  	  Mildred	  Bakan	  explains	  the	  significance	  of	  
Kosik's	  position	  in	  phenomenological	  and	  existential	  terms:	  	  “To	  be	  open	  to	  things,	  however,	  in	  terms	  of	  work,	  
is	  to	  be	  open	  to	  their	  possible	  transformation.	  	  The	  transformation	  of	  things	  opens	  us	  to	  their	  causal	  relations.	  	  
The	  transformation	  of	  nature	  requires	  the	  intelligent	  use	  of	  natural	  resources,	  which	  requires	  bodily	  effort	  and	  
social	  organization”	   (88),	   a	   responsibility	   that	   follows	  not	   from	  a	   “resigned	  alienation	   from	  nature,	   as	   Sartre	  
would	  have	  it,	  but	  as	  part	  of	  nature	  itself”	  (94).	  	  With	  the	  emergence	  of	  praxis,	  nature	  naturing	  can	  become	  a	  
metabolism	  of	  self-­‐care16.	  	  	  
	  
The	  ecocritical	  task	  that	  follows	  from	  such	  a	  position	  is	  threefold:	  	  to	  work	  creatively,	  imagining	  a	  new	  relation	  
of	  the	  particularly	  and	  uniquely	  capable	  life	  of	  human	  culture,	  characterized	  by	  the	  dialectic	  of	  consciousness	  
and	  conditions,	  to	  the	  totality	  of	  vulnerable	  life,	  the	  Very	  Big	  Body;	  to	  work	  critically	  rather	  than	  thematically,	  
with	  an	  eye	  toward	  natural	  and	  social	  relations	   in	  their	  material	  reality,	   in	  their	  totality;	   to	  work	  rhetorically,	  
thematically,	  or	  performatively	  to	  produce	  in	  a	  public	  such	  a	  form	  of	  consciousness.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  is	  a	  complex	  
task	  with	  divergent	  modes	  of	  articulation	  and	  possibility	  and	  are	  already	  undertaken	  in	  different	  ways	  among	  
ecocritics,	  inclusive	  of	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  work	  of	  offering	  “green	  readings”	  and	  producing	  “nature	  writing.”	  	  
Before	  describing	  only	  one	  of	  them,	  the	  critical	  task,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  such	  an	  
alternative	  may	  be	  produced	  or	  considered,	  addressing	  the	  “alternative	  to	  what?”	  question.	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   “uneven	   development,”	   in	   labor	   and	   in	   the	   exploitation	   of	   bioregions,	   the	   temporality	   of	   the	  
present	  demands	  an	  alternative.	   	  The	   familiarity	  of	   these	  claims	  does	  not	  diminish	   their	   truth	  value:	   	   time	   is	  
running	   short	   and	   this	   cannot	   go	  on	  much	   longer,	   in	   fact	   it	  may	  be	   too	   late	   already.	   	  Natural	  materials,	   life	  
forms,	   are	   of	   themselves	   qualitatively	   different,	   creative.	   	   Like	   creative	   human	   labor,	   these	   qualitatively	  
different	  flows	  are	  homogenized,	  “enclosed”	  (to	  invoke	  Snyder's	  recuperation	  of	  the	  Trajedy	  of	  the	  Commons)	  
by	  capital	   into	  a	  qualitative	  regime	  of	  valuation	  as	  a	  productive	  force.	   	  Under	  capitalist	  social	  relations,	  those	  
whose	  creative	  labor	  is	  exploited—the	  earth's	  bioregions	  and	  native	  cultures,	  and	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  
of	  its	  working	  population—has	  no	  say	  in	  how	  the	  quantitative	  value	  of	  that	  productive	  act	  is	  to	  be	  distributed,	  
nor	  how	  or	  what	  will	  be	  produced,	  and	  with	  little	  meaningful	  regard	  for	  the	  utility	  (“use	  value”)	  of	  that	  produce	  
considered.	   	   Capital,	   as	   a	   class,	   reserves	   those	   decisions	   to	   itself,	   and	   has	   little	   incentive	   to	   regard	   the	  
qualitatively	   divergent	   needs,	   capacities,	   histories,	   or	   simple	   sustainability	   of	   life	   of	   those	   it	   exploits	   in	   its	  
decisions17.	  	  And	  where	  the	  products	  of	  nature	  are	  more	  or	  less	  legible	  as	  objects	  of	  history—a	  stone	  does	  not	  
obfuscate	   the	   history	   of	   its	   production	   when	   a	   geologist	   examines	   it—the	   products	   of	   capital	   are	   not	   so	  
transparent18.	  	  The	  destruction	  of	  a	  particular	  forest	  is	  not	  immediately	  visible	  in	  the	  living	  room	  of	  an	  exurban	  
McMansion	  tacked	  together	  from	  the	  cellulose	  extracted	  from	  that	  forest,	  or	  the	  foreclosure	  notice	  waiting	  in	  
the	  mailbox19.	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The	  point	  is	  that	  this	  work	  of	  reading	  things	  in	  and	  of	  the	  world	  and	  writing	  about	  them	  is	  a	  political	  project	  par	  
excellence:	   	  “Recognizing,	  and	  becoming	  conscious	  of	  the	  character	  of	  the	  system	  as	  one	  of	  exploitation	  is	  an	  
indispensable	  condition	   for	   the	  odyssey	  of	  one	  historical	   form	  of	  praxis,”	   that	  of	   capitalist	  accumulation,	   “to	  
culminate	   in	   a	   revolutionary	   praxis,”	   Kosik	   argues	   (112).	   	   This	   concept	   of	   temporality	   presents	   a	   position	   of	  
integrated	   critical	   thought	   and	   political	   action	   that	   can	   be	   helpful	   to	   the	   ecocritic.	   	   This	   is	   the	   practical	  
significance	  of	  the	  preceding	  philosophical	  speculations	  on	  temporality.	  	  Thoughts	  on	  their	  practical	  application	  
follow.	  
The	  Organic	  Ecocritic	  
To	  be	  determined	  at	  present	   is	   to	  have	  been	  so	   in	   the	  past;	   to	  have	  a	  history	  and	  to	  be	  part	  of	  one	   is	   to	  be	  
neither	   something	   nor	   nothing.	   	   Not	   something	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   a	   static,	   independent,	   and	   salvable	   soul	  
independent	   of	   social	   life	   and	   biological	   need	   (the	   sovereign	   consumer-­‐citizen	   of	   neoliberalism)—but	   not	  
nothing,	  because	  one	  is	  a	  recognizable	  pattern	  of	  affiliation,	  among	  others,	  with	  certain	  capacities	  such	  as	  the	  
ability	   to	   learn.	   	   I	   follow	  Antonio	  Gramsci,	   in	  short,	   in	  describing	  the	  determined	  subject	  as	  a	  process	  and	  as	  
competent	  to	  critical	  consciousness,	  that	  is,	  coming	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  is	  embedded	  within	  
dynamics	  of	  need	  and	  exploitation	  (one	  is	  exploited	  in	  laboring	  to	  meet	  ones	  needs),	  much	  as	  very	  many	  others	  
are	  also	  embedded	  in	  the	  same	  dynamic,	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  transforming	  it.	  	  Gramsci	  works	  within	  the	  same	  
Enlightenment	   ethos	  Kosik	   does:	   	   “in	   putting	   the	  question	   'what	   is	  man?'	  what	  we	  mean	   is:	   	  what	   can	  man	  
become?	  	  That	  is,	  can	  man	  dominate	  his	  own	  destiny,	  can	  he	  'make	  himself,'	  can	  he	  create	  his	  own	  life?	  	  We	  
maintain	  therefore	  that	  man	  is	  a	  process,	  and,	  more	  exactly,	  the	  process	  of	  his	  actions”	  (351).	  	  Actions	  are	  here	  
taken	  in	  both	  volitional,	  creative,	  and	  conscious	  terms,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  complex	  of	  mechanical	  and	  unconscious	  
actions	   characterizable	   as	   compulsion,	   routine,	   or	   habit.	   	   There	   is	   a	   way	   to	   understand	   this	   distinction	   in	  
Cultural	  Studies,	  for	  instance,	  where	  the	  Terror	  of	  the	  Situation	  is	  expressed	  primarily	  through	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  
aesthetic—for	  instance,	  Guy	  Debord	  understands	  the	  subject	  as	  wholly	  identified	  with	  the	  spectacle,	  but	  leaves	  
the	  door	  open	  to	  “art”	  as	  a	  conscious	  alternative,	  while	  Herbert	  Marcuse	  is	  able	  to	  think	  the	  one-­‐dimensional-­‐
man	  and	  the	  Great	  Refusal	  at	  once.	  	  	  
	  
But	   instead	  of	  playing	  one	  side	  of	   the	  mechanical/creative	  binary	  against	   the	  other,	  Gramsci,	   the	   imprisoned	  
optimist,	   instead	   posits	   the	  distinction	   or	   decision	   between	   conscious	   and	   unconscious	   action	   as	   the	   site	   of	  
agency:	  	  “If	  one's	  individuality	  is	  the	  ensemble	  of	  these	  relations,	  to	  create	  one's	  personality	  means	  to	  acquire	  
consciousness	  of	  them	  and	  to	  modify	  the	  ensemble	  of	  these	  relations”	  (352).	  	  Embedded	  within	  this	  description	  
of	  the	  dialectic	  of	  consciousness	  and	  conditions	  are	  the	  premises	  of	  Gramscian	  politics.	  	  Absent	  the	  possibility	  
for	  critical	  consciousness	  and	  socially-­‐useful	  knowledge,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  “organic	  intellectuals”	  organizing	  and	  
teaching	  the	  laboring	  class,	  understood	  here	  to	  include	  not	  only	  a	  now	  globalized	  proletariat	  but	  also	  the	  sum	  
of	   animated	   nature	   made	   vulnerable	   by	   the	   consequences	   of	   capitalist	   accumulation	   (hence,	   the	   “organic	  
ecocritic”).	   	   And	   for	   Gramsci	   this	   politics	   is	   necessarily	   social	   and	   plural,	   insofar	   as	   “each	   individual	   is	   the	  
synthesis	  not	  only	  of	  existing	  relations,	  but	  of	  the	  history	  of	  these	  relations”	  (353).	  	  This	  description	  of	  agency	  
has	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   descriptive	   power	   for	   repositioning	   the	   ecocritic	   in	   the	   historical	   time	   of	   the	   local	   or	  
bioregional	  totality	  of	   life-­‐relations	  in	  which	  the	  body	  and	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  “organic”	  intellectual	   inheres,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  Very	  Big	  Body.	  	  To	  the	  point,	  this	  critical	  position	  is	  in	  productive	  contrast	  to	  the	  mainline	  surely	  not	  
the	  whole	  of	  contemporary	  ecocriticism	  I	  have	  described:	  	  the	  present	  and	  consciousness	  of	  it	  are	  understood	  
as	  contingent	  on	  the	  past,	  and	  are	  necessarily	  plural	  rather	  than	  reified	  into	  the	  singular	  neoliberal	  subject	  or,	  
for	  that	  matter,	  a	  metaphysics	  of	  a	  collective	  unconscious	  or	  dialectically-­‐emerging	  World-­‐Spirit.	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Conclusion:	  Time	  to	  Draw	  It	  All	  Together	  
Dialectics	  of	  the	  Concrete	  is	  significant	  and	  warranted	  primarily	  because	  it	  recuperates	  a	  specifically	  dialectical	  
materialism,	   and	  with	   that	   a	   conceptual	   opening	   onto	   objective	   time	   that	  may	   sidestep	   the	   conceptual	   and	  
political	   problems	   presented	   by	   the	   “vulgar	   materialist”	   categories	   of	   Soviet	   Marxist	   orthodoxy	   and	   the	  
idealism	  latent	   in	  the	  Hegelian	  texts	  from	  which	  it	  derived.	   	  Gramsci	  summarizes	  this	  orthodoxy	  in	  a	  relevant	  
way:	  	  “even	  the	  philosophy	  of	  praxis,”	  Gramsci's	  cipher	  for	  Marxism,	  “tends	  to	  become	  an	  ideology	  in	  the	  worst	  
sense	  of	  the	  word,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  a	  dogmatic	  system	  of	  eternal	  and	  absolute	  truths,”	  when	  “it	  is	  confused	  with	  
vulgar	  materialism,	  with	  its	  metaphysics	  of	  'matter'	  which	  is	  necessarily	  eternal	  and	  absolute”	  (406-­‐7).	  	  In	  the	  
dialectical	   materialism	   against	   which	   both	   Gramsci	   and	   Kosik,	   in	   different	   ways	   and	   by	   different	   means,	  
pushed,	  the	   living	  body	  of	  nature	   is	  reduced	  to	  a	  set	  of	  static	  objects	  to	  be	  swept	   into	  the	  forward	  march	  of	  
objective	  time.	  	  Objective	  time	  emerges	  in	  this	  view	  as	  the	  inevitable	  progression	  of	  the	  orthodox	  Party	  and	  the	  
State.	  	  	  
	  
By	  contrast	  to	  this	  view	  and	  the	  political	  power	  that	  advanced	  it,	  Kosik	  does	  not	  construct	  or	  preserve	  a	  static	  
and	   idealized	   (and	  hence	  dehistoricized	  and	  atemporal)	  object	  of	   the	  phenomenal	  world	  by	  an	  equally	  static	  
and	   idealized	  subject	   (also,	  hence,	  dehistoricized	  and	  atemporal)20.	   	  Kosik	   instead	  takes	  subject	  and	  object	   in	  
dialectical	   relation	   to	   each	   other	   in	   historical	   time,	   and	   presents	   each	   in	   itself	   as	   an	   in-­‐process	   product	   of	  
historical	   time,	   of	   the	   ongoing	   practices	   and	   metabolisms	   of	   daily	   life.	   	   Ultimately,	   because	   subjects	   are	  
determined	  by	  their	  objective	  relations,	  which	  are	  acted	  on	  by	  subjective	  agency	  (labor	  and	  creativity),	  one	  can	  
say	  that	  consciousness	  and	  conditions	  are	  co-­‐constitutive	  of	  each	  other.	  	  Nature	  natures.	  	  Further,	  this	  need	  not	  
be	  a	  taken	  as	  a	  set	  of	  concepts	  empty	  of	  empirical	  content,	   like	  a	  “castle	   in	  the	  sky.”	   	  Objective	  time	  can	  be	  
traced	  by	  means	  of	   the	   transformations	   that	  are	   legible	   in	  objects	  and	   interactions	  among	  objects,	  objective	  
conditions;	   subjective	   time,	   by	   the	   legible	   changes	   in	   forms	  of	   consciousness.	   	   If	   critical	  materialists	   such	   as	  
Timpanaro	  insist,	  correctly	  in	  my	  view,	  that	  the	  seemingly-­‐passive	  stuff	  that	  is	  matter	  must	  be	  taken	  seriously,	  
and	   if	   ecocriticism	   and	   bioregionalism	   insist,	   also	   correctly,	   that	   multivalent	   and	   local	   life	   must	   be	   taken	  
seriously,	   then	  Kosik	  points	  toward	  a	  conceptual	   frame	  in	  which	  both	  can	  be	  done	  without	  doing	  violence	  to	  
either.	   	   It	   also	  presents	  a	   supple	   vocabulary	  with	  which	   to	  discuss	  objective	   time,	  worlds	  of	   life	   coming	   into	  
being	   and	   peaceful	   futures	   imagined,	   without	   falling	   into	   some	   of	   the	   conceptual	   problems	   that	   can	  
characterize	  such	  attempts,	  such	  as	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  private	  theology	  as	  a	  form	  of	  public	  knowledge	  in	  so-­‐
called	   intelligent	   design	   theory	   or	   its	   ally,	   integral	   ecology21,	   or	   the	   dogmatic	   refusal	   to	   consider	   material	  
matters	  of	  socially	  produced	  poverty	  and	  scarcity	  as	  matters	  of	  public	  concern	  for	  everyone,	  so	  characteristic	  of	  
libertarian	   and	   corporatist	   political	   programs	   (Nozick,	   1974).	   	   Further,	   this	   way	   of	   framing	   the	   problem	   of	  
“organic	  ecocriticism”	   following	  Kosik	  has	  direct	   rhetorical	  power,	  as	  Greg	  Garrard	   rightly	   suggests	   this	  work	  
should	   have:	   	   if	   the	   romanticism	   Jonathan	   Bate	   evokes	   is	   a	   heartfelt	   nostalgia	   pace	  William	  Wordsworth,	   I	  
propose	  instead	  that	  ecocritics	  aim	  for	  the	  gut	  and	  describe	  directly	  how	  ecological	  crises	  emerge	  from	  specific	  
social	  practices,	  and	  how	  that	  temporal	  rhythm	  can	  assure	  future	  crises	  impactful	  on	  anyone's	  ability	  to	  survive	  
and	  on	   the	  potential	   for	  one	   to	   fulfill	   his	   or	  her	   self-­‐realization22.	  Given	   the	   choice	  between	  Wordsworthian	  
nostalgia,	   imagining	   backward,	   and	   the	   authority	   of	   material	   science	   in	   convincing	   someone	   of	   imagining	  
forward	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  Trouble	  Ahead,	  of	  material	   scarcity	  and	   insecurity	  even	   in	   the	  suburbs,	   in	  a	  way	  
that	  can	  be	  felt	  as	  much	  as	  thought,	  I	  will	  advocate	  for	  the	  latter.	  
	  
In	  sum,	  the	  temporal	  approach	  advanced	  here	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  avoiding	  a	  reliance	  on	  an	  idealism	  of	  the	  
subject	  or	  reification	  of	  Nature	  so	  prevalent	  in	  ecocritical	  work	  prior	  to	  Morton's	  Ecology	  without	  Nature	  and	  
still	   circulating,	   and	   more	   importantly,	   the	   forced	   homogenization	   of	   qualitative	   biological	   diversity	   to	   the	  
quantitative	  terms	  of	  capitalist	  social	  relations.	  	  Further,	  it	  provides	  a	  rationale	  for	  both	  valences	  of	  ecocritical	  
work,	  that	  of	  public	  politics	  and	  of	  critical	  thought,	  without	  putting	  those	  terms	  in	  contradiction	  to	  each	  other,	  
and	  does	  so	  often	  from	  premises	  that	  had	  long	  before	  emerged	  among	  ecocritics.	  
Journal	  of	  Ecocriticism	  4(2)	  July	  2012	  
	  
Natura	  Naturans	  (34-­‐47)	   	   44	  
Endnotes
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   	  The	  recent	  verdict	  of	  an	  Orion	  Magazine	  editor	  that	  “nature	  writing	  is	  dead”	  is	  but	  one	  example	  of	  this.	  	  The	  present	  
essay	  argues	  that	  neither	  nature	  writing	  nor	  the	  beyond	  of	  nature	  writing	  are	  dead	  and	  that	  neither	  need	  to	  die.	  
2	   David	  Landis	  Barnhill's	  contribution	  to	  The	  Bioregional	  Imagination	  is	  a	  particularly	  strong	  specimen	  of	  this	  species.	  
3	   Both	   of	   these	   alternatives	   emerge	   from	   nineteenth	   century	   natural	   philosophy,	   a	   cultural	   matrix	   that	   has	   been	  
productively	   developed	   for	   ecocritical	   purposes;	   see	   Alice	   Jenkins'	   work	   on	   Alexander	   von	   Humboldt	   (2007),	   and	  
Michael	  Cohen's	   (2007)	  proposal	   for	   “Darwinian”	   reading.	   	  A	  detailed	  assessment	  of	   the	  engagement	  between	   the	  
ecological	  humanities	  and	  such	  discourses	  is	  warranted.	  
4	   By	   contrast	   to	   the	   idealism	   of	   such	   writers	   as	   Sivaramakrishnan,	   one	   of	   the	   virtues	   of	   Gary	   Snyder's	   explicitly	  
contemplative	  Practice	  of	   the	  Wild	   is	   its	   insistence	  on	   locating	   the	  present	   in	  a	  matrix	  of	  historical	  determinations,	  
which	  he	  summarizes	  as	  “the	  spirit	  of	  the	  place”	  (41).	  
5	   It	  is	  also	  hoped	  that	  an	  article	  on	  a	  book	  called	  Dialectics	  of	  the	  Concrete	  may	  make	  a	  point	  of	  introduction	  between	  
recent	   work	   in	   Object	   Studies	   and	   the	   environmental	   humanities	   generally.	   	   Arjun	   Appadurai,	   Fiona	   Candlin	   and	  
Raiford	  Guins,	  Jane	  Bennett,	  and	  Ian	  Hodder	  make	  particularly	  relevant	  contributions	  in	  this	  context.	  
6	   Jonathan	  Bate's	  The	  Song	  of	   the	  Earth	  and	  Glen	  Love's	  Practical	  Ecocriticism	   represent	   two	  strong	  examples	  of	   this	  
problem,	  particularly	  in	  their	  repudiation	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Raymond	  Williams.	  On	  the	  question	  of	  the	  overdetermination	  
of	  discipline	  in	  ecocriticism,	  see	  my	  essay	  “Accumulating-­‐Capital,	  Accumulating-­‐Carbon.”	  
7	   Peter	  Kropotkin's	  Mutual	  Aid	  offers	  useful	  another	  example,	  well	  outside	  the	  Marxist	  canon.	  
8	   As	  Douglas	  Brownlow	  Winslow	  shows,	  natura	  naturans	  and	  related	  concepts	  are	  integral	  to	  understanding	  Coleridge's	  
poetics,	  which	  are	  integrated	  seamlessly	  with	  his	  attitude	  toward	  nature.	  
9	   Rigby	   complicates	   the	   description	   of	   natura	   naturans	   in	   the	   present	   essay,	   claiming	   natura	   naturata	   is	   Spinoza's	  
concept	  of	  a	  “self-­‐generative”	  nature,	  and	  natura	  naturans	  is	  “nature	  natured,	  which	  is	  nature	  as	  it	  presents	  itself	  to	  
us	  as	  a	  world	  of	  things”	  (41).	  
10	   Lucio	  Colletti	  argues	  that	  dialectical	  materialism	  predicated	  on	  the	  “dialectic	  of	  matter,”	  which	  is	  to	  say	  the	  Marxist	  
philosophical	   tradition	   following	   from	   Friedrich	   Engels,	   is	   predicated	   on	   a	  misreading	   of	   Hegel	   (14).	   	   If	   Colletti's	  
argument	   is	   accepted,	   then	   the	   present	   essay	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   exercise	   in	   sorting	   through	   such	  
misinterpretations.	  	  I	  suggest	  that	  insofar	  as	  Kosik	  pushes	  against	  the	  idealism	  of	  the	  Party	  and	  State	  as	  the	  engines	  of	  
history	  in	  diamat	  in	  his	  philosophical	  work	  and	  in	  his	  activism	  against	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  U.S.S.R.,	  then	  he	  produces	  
a	  dialectic	  of	  matter	  that	  is	  neither	  Hegelian-­‐idealistic	  nor	  State-­‐mystical.	  
11	   Hall	   had	   retreated	   from	   this	  position	  by	  1992,	   after	   the	   “linguistic	   turn”	   in	  Cultural	   Studies.	   	  However,	   I	   find	  much	  
value	   in	  his	  original	   insight,	  which	  predicates	  much	  of	  my	  work	   in	   the	   field	  of	   integral	   theory,	   including	   the	  essays	  
“Such	   a	   Body”	   and	   “Sweet	   Science.”	   	   These	   treatise-­‐length	   texts	   propose,	   through	   a	   rather	   elaborate	   kind	   of	  
performance,	   an	   alternative	   ontology	   to	   that	   proposed	   by	   Ken	  Wilber	   in	   Sex,	   Ecology,	   and	   Spirituality,	   and,	  more	  
recently,	  Sean	  Esbjorn-­‐Hargens	  and	  Michael	  Zimmerman	  in	  Integral	  Ecology.	  	  They	  also	  inform	  the	  dialectical	  frame	  I	  
propose	  in	  this	  paragraph.	  
12	   	  Kosik's	  significance	  here	  is	  also	  seen	  in	  his	  concept	  of	  concrete	  totality,	  which,	  as	  L.	  Roland	  Irons	  suggests,	  shows	  that	  
Marxian	   analysis	   (and	   by	   extension	   critical	   theory)	   emerges	   not	   through	   dichotomized	   scientific	   and	   philosophical	  
bodies	  of	  thought,	  but	   instead	   in	  an	   integration	  of	  scientific	  and	  philosophical	  practices	  (167),	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
integration	  of	  “eco”	  and	  “critical”	  discussed	  here.	  	  	  	  
13	   See	   Lukacs,	   History	   and	   Class	   Consciousness.	   	   The	   work	   of	   Guy	   Debord	   and	   the	   Situationist	   International	   on	   the	  
spectacle	  as	  false	  consciousness	  is	  also	  of	  particular	  relevance.	  
14	   Here	  the	  work	  of	  David	  Harvey,	  Ted	  	  Benton,	  James	  O'Connor,	  Paul	  Burkett,	  John	  Bellamy	  Foster,	  and	  Kate	  Soper	  are	  
of	  particular	  significance.	  
15	   	  The	  reception	  of	  Heidegger	  in	  ecocriticism	  is	  complex	  and	  the	  question	  of	  Heidegger's	  value	  for	  ecocritics	  is	  presently	  
debated,	   as	   in	   the	   recent	   exchange	   in	   ISLE	   between	   Greg	   Garrard	   and	   John	   Claborn.	   	  While	   working	   through	   the	  
unresolved	   issues	   in	   this	   exchange	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   paper,	   such	   a	   task	   may	   offer	   a	   fruitful	   point	   of	  
departure	  for	  future	  work.	  
16	   In	   this	   paragraph	   especially,	   I	   am	   attempting	   to	   flesh	   out	   the	   utopian	   content	   of	   Kosik's	   thought	   along	   the	   lines	  
suggested	   in	   Ernst	   Bloch's	   The	   Principle	   of	   Hope,	   an	   admittedly	   problematic	   and	   demanding	   work	   which	   yet	   has	  
significant	  value	  for	  future	  ecocritical	  projects.	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17	   	  This	   is,	   in	   summary,	   an	   ecological	  Marxist	   argument	   for	   the	   need	   for	   regime	   change,	   synthesizing	   the	   theoretical	  
claims	  of	  David	  Harvey	  and	  James	  O'Connor.	  
18	   In	   The	   Dialectic	   of	   Seeing,	   Susan	   Buck-­‐Morss	   gives	   an	   exemplary	   approach	   to	   reading	   historical	   (cultural	   and	  
ecological)	  objects	  through	  her	  reading	  of	  Benjamin's	  The	  Arcades	  Project.	   	  The	  present	  essay	  could	  be	  extended	  to	  
consider	  how	  temporality	  as	  produced	  by	  objectification	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  the	  scales	  of	  time	  Buck-­‐Morss	  lays	  out.	  
19	   	  Following	  Benjamin	  and	  Buck-­‐Morss,	   I	  suggest	  that	  the	   image	  of	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐gas	  SUV	  in	  the	  driveway	  of	  a	  foreclosed	  
and	  abandoned	  McMansion	  may	  be	  the	  “dialectical	  image”	  of	  contemporary	  capitalism:	  	  the	  mismatch	  between	  the	  
false	  consciousness	  of	  the	  George	  Bush	  years	  meets	  the	  reality	  of	  resource	  scarcity.	  
20	   	  It	   is	  significant	  that,	  while	  Dialectics	  of	  the	  Concrete	  was	  written	  some	  five	  years	  before	  the	  Prague	  Spring	  of	  1968,	  
the	  thrust	  of	  that	  document	  is	  an	  analogous	  expression	  of	  political	  resistance	  in	  philosophical	  form.	  
21	   	  Wilber's	  Sex,	  Ecology,	  and	  Spirituality	  and	  Integral	  Ecology	  by	  Esbjorn-­‐Hargens	  and	  Zimmerman	  follow	  this	  pattern	  to	  
the	   letter.	   	  Sam	  Mickey's	   (2010)	  exploration	  of	   this	  material	   in	  Deleuzian	  terms	  seems	  to	  recall	   themes	   in	  my	  2006	  
article,	  “Of	  Syntheses	  and	  Surprises,”	  but	  with	  an	  emphasis	  much	  more	  in	  line	  with	  Wilber.	  
22	   	  The	   work	   of	   Mike	   Davis	   is	   particularly	   helpful	   in	   this	   respect;	   in	   forthcoming	   work	   I	   intend	   to	   show	   how	   Davis'	  




Anderson,	  Daniel	  Gustav.	   “Accumulating-­‐Capital,	  Accumulating-­‐Carbon,	  and	   the	  Very	  Big	  Vulnerable	  Body:	  An	  Object	  of	  
Responsibility	  for	  Ecocriticism.”	  Public	  Knowledge	  3.2	  (2012):	  n.	  pag.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	   “Critical	   Bioregionalist	  Method	   in	  Dune:	   	   A	   Position	   Paper.”	   The	   Bioregional	   Imagination.	   Athens,	   GA:	  University	   of	  
Georgia	  Press,	  2012.	  226–242.	  Print.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  “Of	  Syntheses	  and	  Surprises:	  	  Toward	  a	  Critical	  Integral	  Theory.”	  Integral	  Review	  3	  (2006):	  62–81.	  Print.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  “‘Such	  a	  Body	  We	  Must	  Create’:	  	  New	  Theses	  on	  Integral	  Micropolitics.”	  The	  Integral	  Review	  4.2	  (2008):	  4–70.	  Print.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  “‘Sweet	  Science’:	  A	  Proposal	  for	  Integral	  Macropolitics.”	  The	  Integral	  Review	  6.1	  (2010):	  10–62.	  Print.	  
Anderson,	  Perry.	  Arguments	  Within	  English	  Marxism.	  London:	  NLB,	  1980.	  Print.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  Considerations	  on	  Western	  Marxism.	  London:	  NLB,	  1976.	  Print.	  
Appadurai,	  Arjun,	  ed.	  The	  Social	  Life	  of	  Things:	  	  Commodities	  in	  Cultural	  Perspective.	  Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  1988.	  Print.	  
Bakan,	  Mildred.	   “Karel	   Kosik’s	   Phenomenological	   Heritage.”	   Phenomenology	   in	   a	   Pluralistic	   Context.	   Albany,	   NY:	   State	  
University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1983.	  81–94.	  Print.	  
Barnhill,	   David	   Landis.	   “Critical	   Utopianism	   and	   Bioregional	   Ecocriticism.”	   The	   Bioregional	   Imagination.	   Athens,	   GA:	  
University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2012.	  212–225.	  Print.	  
Bate,	  Jonathan.	  The	  Song	  of	  the	  Earth.	  London:	  Picador,	  2000.	  Print.	  
Benjamin,	  Walter.	  The	  Arcades	  Project.	  Trans.	  Howard	  Eiland	  &	  Kevin	  McLaughlin.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  
Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1999.	  Print.	  
Bennett,	  Jane.	  Vibrant	  Matter:	  A	  Political	  Ecology	  of	  Things.	  Durham,	  NC:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  Print.	  
Benton,	  Ted.	  “Natural	  Science	  and	  Cultural	  Struggle:	   	  Engels	  and	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Natural	  Sciences.”	   Issues	  in	  Marxist	  
Philosophy:	  	  Volume	  II,	  Materialism.	  Atlantic	  Highlands,	  NJ:	  Humanities	  Press,	  1979.	  101–142.	  Print.	  
Benton,	  Ted,	  ed.	  The	  Greening	  of	  Marxism.	  New	  York:	  Guilford	  Press,	  1996.	  Print.	  
Bloch,	  Ernst.	  The	  Principle	  of	  Hope.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press,	  1986.	  Print.	  
Buck-­‐Morss,	  Susan.	  The	  Dialectics	  of	  Seeing:	  Walter	  Benjamin	  and	  the	  Arcades	  Project.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press,	  1991.	  
Print.	  
Burkett,	  Paul.	  Marx	  and	  Nature:	  A	  Red	  and	  Green	  Perspective.	  New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1999.	  Print.	  
Candlin,	  Fiona,	  and	  Raiford	  Guins,	  eds.	  The	  Object	  Reader.	  London:	  Routledge,	  2009.	  Print.	  
Claborn,	   John.	   “Towards	   an	   Eco-­‐Ontology:	   A	   Response	   to	   Greg	   Gararrd’s	   ‘Heidegger	   Nazism	   Ecocriticism’.”	   ISLE:	  	  
Interdisciplinary	  Studies	  in	  Literature	  and	  the	  Environment	  18.3	  (2011):	  1–5.	  Print.	  
Cohen,	   Michael.	   “Reading	   After	   Darwin:	   	   A	   Prospectus.”	   Coming	   into	   Contact:	   	   Explorations	   in	   Ecocritical	   Theory	   and	  
Practice.	  Athens,	  GA:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007.	  221–233.	  Print.	  
Journal	  of	  Ecocriticism	  4(2)	  July	  2012	  
	  
Natura	  Naturans	  (34-­‐47)	   	   46	  
Colletti,	  Lucio.	  Marxism	  and	  Hegel.	  Trans.	  Lawrence	  Garner.	  London:	  NLB,	  1973.	  Print.	  
Davis,	  Mike.	  Planet	  of	  Slums.	  London:	  Verso,	  2006.	  Print.	  
Debord,	  Guy.	  The	  Society	  of	  the	  Spectacle.	  Trans.	  Donald	  Nicholson-­‐Smith.	  New	  York:	  Zone	  Books,	  1995.	  Print.	  
Engels,	  Friedrich.	  Dialectics	  of	  Nature.	  Trans.	  Clemens	  Dutt.	  New	  York:	  International	  Publishers,	  1940.	  Print.	  
Esbjorn-­‐Hargens,	  Sean,	  and	  Michael	  E.	  Zimmerman.	  Integral	  Ecology:	  	  United	  Multiple	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Natural	  World.	  
Boston,	  MA:	  Integral	  Books,	  2009.	  Print.	  
Estok,	  Simon	  C.	  “Theory	  from	  the	  Fringes:	  	  Animals,	  Ecocriticism,	  Shakespeare.”	  Mosaic	  40.1	  (2007):	  61–78.	  Print.	  
Forrest,	   Barbara,	   and	   Paul	   R.	   Gross.	  Creationism’s	   Trojan	   Horse:	   	   The	  Wedge	   of	   Intelligent	   Design.	   Oxford,	   UK:	   Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2004.	  Print.	  
Foster,	  John	  Bellamy.	  Marx’s	  Ecology:	  Materialism	  and	  Nature.	  New	  York:	  Monthly	  Review	  Press,	  2000.	  Print.	  
Garrard,	  Greg.	  Ecocriticism.	  London:	  Routledge,	  2004.	  Print.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  “Heidegger	  Nazism	  Ecocriticism.”	  ISLE:	  	  Interdisciplinary	  Studies	  in	  Literature	  and	  the	  Environment	  17.2	  (2010):	  251–71.	  
Print.	  
Gifford,	  Terry.	  “Recent	  Critiques	  of	  Ecocriticism.”	  New	  Formations	  64	  (2008):	  15–24.	  Print.	  
Gramsci,	   Antonio.	   Selections	   from	   the	   Prison	   Notebooks.	   Ed.	   Quintin	   Hoare	   &	   Geoffrey	   Nowell	   Smith.	   New	   York:	  
International	  Publishers,	  1971.	  Print.	  
Gurdjieff,	  G.I.	  All	  and	  Everything:	  	  Beelzebub’s	  Tales	  to	  His	  Grandson.	  New	  York:	  Penguin	  Arkana,	  1999.	  Print.	  
Hall,	  Stuart.	  “Cultural	  Studies	  and	  Its	  Theoretical	  Legacies.”	  Cultural	  Studies.	  Ed.	  Lawrence	  Grossberg,	  Cary	  Nelson,	  &	  Paula	  
Treichler.	  London:	  Routledge,	  1992.	  277–294.	  Print.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  “Cultural	  Studies:	  	  Two	  Paradigms.”	  Media,	  Culture,	  and	  Society	  2	  (1980):	  57–72.	  Print.	  
Harvey,	  David.	  Justice,	  Nature,	  and	  the	  Geography	  of	  Difference.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  1996.	  Print.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  Spaces	  of	  Hope.	  Berkeley,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2000.	  Print.	  
Head,	   Dominic.	   “Beyond	   2000:	   Raymond	   Williams	   and	   the	   Ecocritic’s	   Task.”	   The	   Environmental	   Tradition	   in	   English	  
Literature.	  Ed.	  John	  Parham.	  Aldershot,	  UK:	  Ashgate,	  2002.	  24–36.	  Print.	  
Hodder,	  Ian.	  Entangled:	  	  An	  Archaeology	  of	  the	  Relationships	  Between	  Humans	  and	  Things.	  London:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2012.	  
Print.	  
Irons,	  L.	  Roland.	  “Dialectics	  of	  the	  Concrete-­‐-­‐The	  Text	  and	  Its	  Czechoslovakian	  Context.”	  New	  German	  Critique	  18	  (1979):	  
167–175.	  Print.	  
Jenkins,	   Alice.	   “Alexander	   Von	   Humboldt’s	   Kosmos	   and	   the	   Beginnings	   of	   Ecocriticism.”	   Interdisciplinary	   Studies	   in	  
Literature	  and	  the	  Environment	  14.2	  (2007):	  89–105.	  Print.	  
Knabb,	  Ken,	  ed.	  Situationist	  International	  Anthology.	  Berkeley,	  CA:	  Bureau	  of	  Public	  Secrets,	  1981.	  Print.	  
Kosik,	  Karel.	  Dialectics	  of	  the	  Concrete:	  	  A	  Study	  on	  Problems	  of	  Man	  and	  World.	  Trans.	  Karel	  Kovanda	  &	  James	  Schmidt.	  
Boston,	  MA:	  D.	  Reidel	  Publishing	  Company,	  1976.	  Print.	  
Kropotkin,	  Petr.	  Mutual	  Aid:	  	  A	  Factor	  of	  Evolution.	  Boston,	  MA:	  Extending	  Horizons	  Books,	  1955.	  Print.	  
Layfield,	  David.	  Marxism	  and	  Environmental	  Crises.	  Bury	  St.	  Edmunds,	  UK:	  Arena	  Books,	  2008.	  Print.	  
Lenin,	  V.I.	  Materialism	  and	  Empirio-­‐Criticism:	  	  Critical	  Comments	  on	  a	  Reactionary	  Philosophy.	  Moscow:	  Foreign	  Languages	  
Publishing	  House,	  1962.	  Print.	  
Love,	   Glen	   A.	  Practical	   Ecocriticism:	   Literature,	   Biology,	   and	   the	   Environment.	   Charlottesville,	   VA:	   University	   of	   Virginia	  
Press,	  2003.	  Print.	  
Lukacs,	  Georg.	  History	  and	  Class	  Consciousness;	  Studies	  in	  Marxist	  Dialectics.	  Trans.	  Rodney	  Livingstone.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  
MIT	  Press,	  1971.	  Print.	  
Marcuse,	  Herbert.	  An	  Essay	  on	  Liberation.	  Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1969.	  Print.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  “The	  Economic	  and	  Philosophical	  Manuscripts.”	  Karl	  Marx:	  	  Selected	  Writings.	  Ed.	  Lawrence	  H.	  Simon.	  Indianapolis,	  IN:	  
Hackett	  Publishing	  Company,	  1994.	  56–97.	  Print.	  
Mickey,	  Sam.	  “Rhizomatic	  Contributions	  to	  Integral	  Ecology.”	  Integral	  Theory	  in	  Action.	  Ed.	  Sean	  Esbjorn-­‐Hargens.	  Albany,	  
NY:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2010.	  325–344.	  Print.	  
Morton,	   Timothy.	   Ecology	   Without	   Nature:	   	   Rethinking	   Environmental	   Aesthetics.	   Cambridge,	   MA:	   Harvard	   University	  
Press,	  2007.	  Print.	  
Newman,	  Lance.	  “Marxism	  and	  Ecocriticism.”	  ISLE:	  	  Interdisciplinary	  Studies	  in	  Literature	  and	  the	  Environment	  9.2	  (2002):	  
1–25.	  Print.	  
Nozick,	  Robert.	  Anarchy,	  State,	  and	  Utopia.	  New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1974.	  Print.	  
Rigby,	  Kate.	  Topographies	  of	  the	  Sacred:	  	  The	  Poetics	  of	  Place	  in	  European	  Romanticism.	  Charlottesville,	  VA:	  University	  of	  
Virginia	  Press,	  2004.	  Print.	  
Journal	  of	  Ecocriticism	  4(2)	  July	  2012	  
	  
Natura	  Naturans	  (34-­‐47)	   	   47	  
Schmidt,	  Alfred.	  The	  Concept	  of	  Nature	  in	  Marx.	  Trans.	  Ben	  Fowkes.	  London:	  NLB,	  1971.	  Print.	  
Sivaramakrishnan,	  Murali.	  “Toward	  a	  Spiritual	  Aesthetics	  of	  the	  Environment:	  	  Quality,	  Space,	  and	  Being	  in	  Sri	  Aurobindo’s	  
Savitri.”	  ISLE:	  	  Interdisciplinary	  Studies	  in	  Literature	  and	  the	  Environment	  18.2	  (2011):	  302–322.	  Print.	  
Slovic,	  Scott.	  Going	  Away	  to	  Think:	   	  Engagement,	  Retreat,	  and	  Ecocritical	  Responsibility.	  Reno,	  NV:	  University	  of	  Nevada	  
Press,	  2008.	  Print.	  
Snyder,	  Gary.	  The	  Practice	  of	  the	  Wild:	  	  Essays.	  San	  Francisco,	  CA:	  North	  Point	  Press,	  1990.	  Print.	  
Soper,	  Kate.	  “Marxism,	  Materialism	  and	  Biology.”	  Issues	  in	  Marxist	  Philosophy:	  	  Volume	  II,	  Materialism.	  Atlantic	  Highlands,	  
NJ:	  Humanities	  Press,	  1979.	  61–99.	  Print.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  On	  Human	  Needs:	  	  Open	  and	  Closed	  Theories	  in	  a	  Marxist	  Perspective.	  Sussex,	  UK:	  Harvester	  Press,	  1981.	  Print.	  
Timpanaro,	  Sebastiano.	  On	  Materialism.	  Trans.	  Lawrence	  Garner.	  London:	  NLB,	  1975.	  Print.	  
Turner,	  Frederick.	  “Cultivating	  the	  American	  Garden.”	  The	  Ecocriticism	  Reader:	  Landmarks	  in	  Literary	  Ecology.	  Athens,	  GA:	  
University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  1996.	  40–51.	  Print.	  
Wilber,	  Ken.	  Sex,	  Ecology,	  Spirituality:	  The	  Spirit	  of	  Evolution.	  Revised	  ed.	  Boston:	  Shambhala,	  2000.	  Print.	  
Williams,	  Raymond.	  Resources	  of	  Hope:	  	  Culture,	  Democracy,	  Socialism.	  New	  York:	  Verso,	  1989.	  Print.	  
Winslow,	   Douglas	   Brownlow.	   “Two	  Modes	   of	   Apprehending	   Nature:	   A	   Gloss	   on	   the	   Coleridgean	   Symbol.”	   PMLA	   87.1	  
(1972):	  42–52.	  Print.	  
